[¶1] The fundamental criteria for obtaining a patent in the
United States are that the invention must be: 1) novel; 2)
non-obvious; and 3) have utility. The "utility" criterion dates
to the first United States Patent Act of 1790.
Under its terms patents could be granted for inventions that were
"sufficiently useful and important."
The "novel" criterion dates to the Patent Act of 1836,
which required the applicant to "particularly specify and point out
the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own
invention or discovery."
The "non-obvious" criterion dates to 1850 and the decision in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, which stated that "unless more
ingenuity and skill in applying [an] old method . . . were required
in the application of it to [a purported new invention] than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there
was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention."
[¶2] In brief, novelty implies that no one can patent something
that is already known (e.g., the wheel). Moreover, if the
invention is described in a printed publication or sold anywhere in
the world, it is not novel. "Non-obvious" means that the
invention cannot have been conceived or invented by someone "having
ordinary skill in the art."
For example, if a 12 year old playing with a toy chemical set
accidentally discovers cold fusion and solves the earth's energy
needs, the resulting invention is not likely to be deemed acceptable
for patenting. Moreover, if anything was known or invented - this
would comprise the "prior art" - at the time of the invention,
then that would make the "new" invention obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the art. And finally, "utility" means
that an invention must perform some function, and generally have
utility or otherwise be beneficial to society.
[¶3] An example of these combined criteria in action are that
one could not simply take the periodic table of elements and combine
these 118 elements into random combinations and patent the resulting
compounds in the hope that someday a use (and hence a value) might be
found for these. As a side point, the actual number of possible
combinations is infinite. The permutations of combinations are
fixed, but the amount of each element could be varied to an infinite
degree (e.g., one molecule, two molecules, three molecules).
Nevertheless, a very large number of random compounds could be
determined with specificity.
[¶4] Note that these three criteria are necessarily vague –
there is no mathematical formula which determines with precision
whether any particular invention satisfies each of these criteria.
As a result, the determination as to a patent's validity is often
left to the discretion of the judge and the flexibility of
interpretation applied to these criteria.
[¶5] In April 2007 the United States Supreme Court issued its
ruling in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. In brief,
the Court essentially made it more difficult for inventors to obtain
patents or patent holders to enforce patents by imposing more
restrictive guidelines on whether a given invention met the burden of
being non-obvious:
[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve
similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond that person's skill. A
court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable
use of prior-art elements according to their established functions.
[¶6] On July 31, 2007 the article How a Patent Ruling Is
Changing Court Cases in the Wall Street Journal indicated
that lower-court judges have begun to rule in favor of companies
defending themselves against infringement lawsuits.
The article further stated:
Technology and financial services companies were particularly hopeful
after the Supreme Court ruling. These companies in recent years have
faced a flood of costly patent-infringement lawsuits, often brought
by patent-licensing and -holding companies -- often derisively called
"patent trolls" -- that buy up patents with the aim of obtaining
royalties from alleged infringers. These companies and other patent
holders argue that courts should vigorously protect ownership rights
or companies will be unwilling to take the risks necessary for
innovation.
[¶7] In addition, a brief review of popular press, legal
journals and other public sources indicates that while the general
consensus is that patents will be more difficult to obtain, and
perhaps enforce, there is little agreement as to the overall effects
of KSR on the amount of patent litigation and, more
importantly, on the cost of licensing. The purpose of this paper is
to present a simple model which attempts to describe the effect of
KSR on licensing costs.
[¶8] While the impact of KSR on the amount of litigation
is uncertain, it is relatively clear that KSR will have an
immediate impact on the aggregate costs of licensing.
I have defined a model which incorporates the proposed cost of the
license (e.g., royalty rate), the fixed costs of litigating, the
variable cost of litigating, and the probability of prevailing should
one choose to litigate. The following numerical examples are
illustrative.
[¶9] Suppose a firm is faced with the choice between paying
$250,000 for a fully paid up lifetime license or litigating. Further
assume that pre-KSR, the probability of winning a challenge
was 25% (or conversely, the probability of losing a challenge was
75%). Case [1] in Table 1 indicates that the firm's expected value
of litigating the patent (i.e., refusing to take a license and
proceeding to litigation) would be negative, and so the optimal
solution would be to simply pay for the license.
Table 1: Numerical Examples
|
Timing relative
to KSR
|
Case
|
Cost of License
|
fixed cost of litigating
|
variable cost of litigating (as % of award)
|
Probability of Losing a Challenge
|
Total Cost of litigating
|
Expected Value of Litigating
|
Outcome
|
|
|
|
[a]
|
[b]
|
[c]
|
[d]
|
[e]=[b]-[c*a]
|
[f]=[1-d]*a+e
|
|
|
Pre-
|
[1]
|
$250,000
|
($100,000)
|
5%
|
75%
|
($112,500)
|
($50,000)
|
Take license
|
|
Post-
|
[2]
|
$250,000
|
($100,000)
|
5%
|
25%
|
($112,500)
|
$75,000
|
Litigate
|
|
Post-
|
[3]
|
$142,856
|
($100,000)
|
5%
|
25%
|
($107,143)
|
($1)
|
Take license
|
[¶10] Now assume that post-KSR, the firm feels that its
probability of winning a challenge actually increases to 75% (or
conversely the probability of losing a challenge decreases to 25%).
As shown under case [2], this would indicate that the firm would
prefer to litigate the outcome rather than simply pay for a license
since the expected value of litigating is positive. Note that under
this scenario, there would actually be an increase in litigation as
firms who were considering taking out licenses (or firms that already
have licenses) now would decide to challenge the patent holder.
[¶11] Of course, one must also consider the issue from the point
of view of the licensor. Its calculations are somewhat different.
Let us assume that the licensor knows the assumptions and values as
given above and agrees with the post-KSR probabilities given
in case [2]. The licensor therefore needs to alter the one parameter
value under its control such that the licensee again simply takes the
license and decides not to litigate. The only way that the licensor
can do this is by changing the cost of license such that the expected
value to the licensee of litigating the patent flips back to just
barely negative. In the simple example given above, this occurs when
the cost of the license (e.g., parameter [a] in the example) is set
at $142,856. At this point, the expected value to the licensee of
litigating the patent is minus one dollar, and so the licensee is
better off taking a license.
[¶12] As this logic gets applied to all licenses and patents,
the aggregate cost of licensing patents will clearly decrease. Or
put another way, the average cost of licenses, all things being
equal, will decline.
[¶13] This has important implications for patent holders,
potential licensees, corporations, legal practitioners and legal
scholars. For example, the Georgia-Pacific factors require
the evaluation of: 1) "[t]he royalties received by the patentee for
the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an
established royalty;" and 2) "[t]he rates paid by the licensee
for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit."
If these historical values were set under pre-KSR conditions,
then one might reasonably be able to argue that the historical rates
are "high" given the new KSR criterion on obviousness and
a new or current license would be less than those observed
benchmarks.
[¶14] In conclusion, it seems unlikely that KSR will
result in a reduction of patents filed and may actually result in an
increase in patent litigation as more patents are challenged (i.e.,
it becomes more profitable to challenge patents). In contrast, the
effect of KSR on licensing costs is likely to be quite clear –
the average cost of a license will decrease. Note that this analysis
has demonstrated the direction of the impact on licensing costs,
i.e., downward pressure. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
determine the actual magnitude of the downward movement.